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Introduction
It has happened to most of us. Your favorite retailer sends you an email alerting you to a
sale, so you immediately click on it and start surfing to see if anything catches your interest.
While you examine a few items, ultimately self-control wins and you close out of the tab while
purchasing nothing. However, the next time you log into Facebook or Instagram, your feed
shows you the same shirt or shoes you were considering not five minutes before. While the
common joke is that this is just “your personal FBI agent earning his salary,” the truth is much
more insidious.
In fact, your browser has most likely been tracking your viewing data and selling that
information to third parties, which then use this data to provide increasingly (and sometimes
terrifyingly) accurate advertisements. And while this has become a boon for social media
companies and web browsers, which often insert the code that surreptitiously tracks its users, it
reflects a declining respect for data privacy.
However, while this practice has become increasingly prevalent, internet users are also
more aware of these practices and are seeking recourse through multiple channels. Many
consumers now use ad blockers, which block both ads and tracking devices that would continue
to monitor their browsing habits after they have left a website.1 Legislation such as the General
Data Protection Regulations2 (“GDPR”) in Europe and the California Consumer Privacy Act of
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1 Augustine Fou, No More Third Party Cookies, No Problemo, FORBES (Aug. 31, 2020, 7:37 AM)
https://www.forbes.com/sites/augustinefou/2020/08/31/no-more-third-party-cookies---good-or-badnews/#286e9b045948
2 2016 O.J. (L. 119).

20183 (“CCPA”) have finally passed, but no data privacy legislation has passed at the United
States federal level recently.4 Therefore, more users are filing lawsuits challenging the
pervasiveness of these techniques based on older laws designed for different technologies.
Following exposés on Google and Facebook’s data collection efforts, class actions filed in the
Third and Ninth Circuits have charged prominent social media and web browsing companies
with unauthorized “interceptions” under the federal Wiretap Act (the “Act”).5 The companies
claimed they had immunity under the “party exception,” which states that parties to a
communication cannot be held liable for an interception under the Act. 6
However, while the Third Circuit held that, due to the direct transmissions between the
plaintiff users and defendant companies, the companies were “parties” to the communication, 7
the Ninth Circuit held that such unauthorized and unknown duplication could not shield a
company from liability under the Act.8 This circuit split creates clear uncertainties, not only in
how companies should amend their business practices, if at all, but also how users should
consider adjusting their browsing habits. It also could lead to the undesirable outcome of “forum
shopping,” which is the practice where litigants select the most favorable jurisdiction for their
claim.9 In this case, it is likely that parties looking to charge companies for their data harvesting
practices will bring suit in the Ninth Circuit, as the court has already established a favorable
precedent for claims brought under the Act.
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Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.100 et seq.
Id.
5 See In re Google Inc., 806 F.3d 125 (3d Cir. 2015); In re Nickelodeon Cons. Priv. Litig., 827 F.3d 262 (3d Cir.
2016); Davis v. Facebook, Inc. (In re Facebook Inc.), 956 F.3d 589 (9th Cir. 2020).
6 The “Act” refers to the version of the Wiretap Act amended by the ECPA, Electronic Communications Privacy
Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510 et. seq. (1986). Any references to the original Wiretap Act will be as the “original Wiretap
Act,” Title III, Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510 et seq. (1968).
7 Google, 806 F.3d at 145.
8 Facebook, 956 F.3d at 608.
9 Stephen Michael Sheppard, The Wolters Kluwer Bouvier’s Law Dictionary Desk Edition (Wolters Kluwer eds.,
Desk ed. 2012).
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This comment will examine interpretations of the Act in light of a rapidly evolving
technological landscape, as well as propose solutions that will balance business development
with respect for individual privacy. Part I of this comment will discuss the evolution of digital
marketing and the business and technological models that allow companies to profit from
customer’s internet searches. It will also discuss virtual “cookies” and how they have augmented
this new advertising model. Part II will discuss the key statutes that are the focus of this
comment, the Act and Electronic Communications Privacy Act, as well as the party and consent
exceptions that many entities have claimed to shield their conduct. Part III will review the Third
and Ninth Circuits interpretations of the Act in light of this changing technological landscape and
the resulting circuit split. Part IV will make recommendations on how courts should interpret the
Act to cope with the rapid expansion of this practice, as well as other legislative and external
solutions users should pursue.
Part I: The Technology
This section will cover the developments and business models that have created invasive
data tracking and harvesting methodologies. As our technology improves, so too do the tools
digital advertisers use to provide services and goods to potential consumers. Increasingly
sophisticated data analytics offer advertisers and websites the ability to build detailed profiles of
consumers, predict their preferences, and offer a tailored advertising portfolio. 10 Industry experts
tout this as a “win-win”: users get more specific ads for products they have a greater
responsiveness to, while businesses achieve higher brand awareness and increase the likelihood
that they will sell a product.11 This has been reflected in the growth of advertising revenues by
large digital and social media companies. Google, for example, generates a substantial amount
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Veronica Marotta, Kaify Zhang & Alessandro Acquisti, Who Benefits from Targeted Advertising,
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_comments/2015/10/00037-100312.pdf
11 Id.

of its revenue through its Google Ads platform, a total of $160.74 billion dollars and almost
seventy-one percent of revenues in the most recent fiscal period. 12 Similarly, Facebook earned
nearly $40 billion from advertising revenues in 2017, which accounted for nearly eighty-five
percent of total revenues.13 It is estimated that Facebook earns $84 from each North American
user and $27 from each of its European users. 14 This difference in earnings is likely due to the
stringent data protection laws Europe has put in place in recent years. 15
Clearly, targeted advertising is a profitable business for corporations. But how do
corporations translate site clicks into revenue? This is usually through something called a
“cookie.” Cookies, unrelated to the dessert, are the software codes that enable much of the
sophisticated digital advertising and online user experience that occurs today. 16 When a cookie
passes between the user’s computer and network server, the server reads the unique identifier
and is able to tailor information specifically to the user. 17 While there are several different types
of cookies, the one most relevant to this comment is the HTTP cookie. 18 These are cookies used
specifically to identify particular users and manage the overall online experience.

19

HTTP

cookies allow websites to remember a user’s profile, log in, shopping carts, and many more
facets that make a consumer’s life significantly easier on the day-to-day basis. 20 These sites
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All you need to know about Third-Party cookies, COOKIE SCRIPT, https://cookie-script.com/all-you-need-to-knowabout-third-partycookies.html#:~:text=Third%2Dparty%20cookies%20are%20cookies,see%20which%20websites%20he%20visited.
13 Brian O’Connell, How Does Facebook Make Money? Six Primary Revenue Streams, THE STREET (Oct. 23, 2018),
https://www.thestreet.com/technology/how-does-facebook-make-money-14754098.
14 Id.
15 Angela Chen, Websites are (probably) making less money because of GDPR, MIT TECHNOLOGY R EVIEW,
https://www.technologyreview.com/2019/07/24/134067/gdpr-privacy-revenue-economics-online-businesslegislation/#:~:text=It's%20the%20first%20study%20of,into%20effect%20in%20May%202018.&text=The%20data
%20showed%20that%20recorded,week%20for%20the%20median%20site.
16 Cookies: What you need to know and how they work, KASPERSKY, https://www.kaspersky.com/resourcecenter/definitions/cookies.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id.

create cookies, which are stored on a user’s web browser, to identify when a user visits a new
website and direct what data to record. 21 If a user returns to that site later, the browser returns an
“identifier” with data from previous sessions. 22
Cookies can be defined by which party installs them. 23 First-party cookies are set by the
website directly visited by the user, and the data collected is used for calculating page views and
the number of users. 24 This data can later be shared with advertisers for targeted advertising
purposes. 25 Third-party cookies are set by entities not directly visited by the user, notably when
the target websites add third-party elements on their site. 26 Once installed on a user’s browser,
these cookies track and save user’s information for ad targeting and behavioral advertising. 27
The classic example of the third-party cookie is the Facebook “Like” button, which will insert a
cookie into the user’s computer which Facebook then accesses to identify the user and his or her
browsing history. 28
Cookies can also be labelled based on when they expire. 29 Session cookies are cookies
that expire immediately or a few seconds after a user leaves a web browser. 30 They are most
often used by e-commerce websites to remember a user’s shopping cart and keep them logged in
during their session, but expire once the user closes out of the browser. 31 If a website did not
use session cookies, items would not remain in a virtual shopping cart until the user got to the
checkout page. 32 Persistent cookies, meanwhile, stay on the user’s browser for an extended
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Cookies, supra note 16.
Id.
23 Rashmita Behera, What are Cookies? Different Types of Web Cookies, Explained, ADPUSHUP (July 1, 2020),
https://www.adpushup.com/blog/types-of-cookies/
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Behera, supra note 23.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Id.
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period of time and will be stored on the browser until their expiry date or the user deletes them.33
These are typically used by publishers to track a single user and his or her interactions with their
website. 34 While on the positive side, they enable persistent shopping carts, which maintain
products in a cart even after a session has ended, they are also the software code used most often
to track user’s browsing history. 35
There are some major drawbacks to this kind of immersive experience. The most
important and obvious is privacy.36 Through cookies, unknown marketers are able to collect
identifiable personal data about a particular user and leverage it for financial gain.
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Additionally, cookies pose a security risk, as outside parties can access highly confidential
information like home address and credit card information if the data is stored on the user’s
browser. 38 For example, bad actors are now running pop-ups that can “scrape” a cookie, copying
code from the browser’s cookie and logging into the targeted site.39 Auto-fill information can
easily be accessed through these means as well. 40 Notably, Yahoo had a major data breach in
2015 and 2016 where hackers used a similar process to bypass the login and password process
for at least some of the 500 million Yahoo mail accounts breached.41 Finally, while companies
argue that these cookies can be disabled, many users are not technologically adept to figure out
how to do so, particularly when browsers are making it increasingly difficult to disable them.42
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Use Of Cookies, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, https://www.scientificamerican.com/page/use-of-cookies/.
Id.
35 Id.
36 The Pros and Cons of Third-Party Cookies, REQ ANALYTICS, https://req.co/insights/article/pros-and-cons-thirdparty-cookies.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Erik Bajaras, Cookie scraping: How data thieves could steal your personal information online , ABC (Nov. 1,
2018), https://abc13.com/cookie-scraping-what-are-internet-cookies-computer-cookies-security/4600107/.
40 Id.
41 Alyssa Newcomb, What Is a Forged Cookie and How Did it Allow Hackers to Get Into My Yahoo Account? ,
NBCNEWS (Feb. 16, 2017), https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/hacking-in-america/what-forged-cookie-how-didit-allow-hackers-get-my-n721866.
42 REQ ANALYTICS, supra note 36.
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While this comment focuses primarily on the negative impact cookies have had on digital
privacy, cookies have also been integral to a cohesive digital experience. 43 Cookies are used to
streamline much of what consumers do. How many times has one closed out of a page, only to
open it back up with their login information still stored or shopping cart still intact? While there
are downsides of this technology related to internet privacy, cookies vastly improve the browsing
experience in several ways, including:
•

Session Management: Allows websites to recognize users and recall unique preferences,
such as the type of news or login information;44

•

Personalization: Cookies use unique data to build targeted advertisements so that users
are looking at products they have a greater interest in;45

•

Tracking: Cookies track previously viewed items, allowing sites to suggest similar goods
and keep selected items in a user’s online shopping cart.46

These increasingly sophisticated tools clearly possess great advantages for which there is no
clear substitute. Therefore, the key is to find a way to balance these invaluable benefits with the
negative impact on consumer’s data privacy, which will be discussed in greater detail below.
Part II: The Statutes
There are two key pieces of legislation that are the subject of this comment. This first is
the original Wiretap Act, formally called Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act of 1968.47 The second is the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (“ECPA”).48
The original Wiretap Act passed following extensive reviews, hearings, and vetting by Congress
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Behera, supra note 23.
Id.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Title III, Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510 et seq. (1968).
48 Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510 et. seq. (1986).
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and various stakeholders in 1967, while the ECPA passed with far less input due to the lack of
public awareness or advocacy groups.49
Before the passage of the ECPA, the original Wiretap Act protected only wire and oral
communications, and provided considerable statutory limitations on their abuse. 50 The ECPA
was passed to provide greater protection to electronic communications and additional clarity on
federal privacy protections.51 It includes three federal statutes: the Act, which amended the
original Wiretap Act,52 the Stored Communications Act, which provides protections for stored
wire and electronic communications,53 and the Pen Register Statute, which covers pen
registers.54
In addition to the Act, plaintiffs in recent years have brought suit for invasive data
monitoring practices under the Stored Communications Act (“SCA”), which protects files stored
by service providers and records held about the user by the service provider, such as his or her
name or IP address. 55 However, litigants who have tried to bring suit under the SCA for these
practices have generally been unsuccessful. 56 Courts have typically held that the legislation
more properly encompasses network service providers57 or centralized data management
entities,58 as opposed to web browsers, and have declined to adopt a broad reading of the SCA.
The Act, as it stands now, prohibits the “interception” of oral, wire, or electronic
communications. 59 Notably, the Act provides a private right of action against private entities
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Susan Freiwald, Online Surveillance: Remembering the Lessons of the Wiretap Act , 56 ALA. L. REV. 9, 74 (2004).
Dorothy Higdon Murphy, United States v. Councilman and the Scope of the Wiretap Act: Do Old Laws Cover
New Technologies?, 6 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 437, 443 (2005).
51 Id.
52 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–22.
53 Id. §§ 2701–10.
54 Id. §§ 3121–27.
55 Id. §§ 2701–12.
56 See infra notes 56–57.
57 Google, 806 F.3d at 146.
58 Facebook, 956 F.3d 609–10.
59 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq.
50

and government actors.60 This stands in contrast to the Fourth Amendment, which serves to
regulate only federal, state, and local actors in the course of criminal investigations. 61 An
electronic communication is defined in part as “any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images,
sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio,
electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical system that affects interstate or foreign
commerce.”62
If a plaintiff brings a claim under Title I of the ECPA, he or she must show that “a
defendant (1) intentionally (2) intercepted, endeavored to intercept or procured another person to
intercept or endeavor to intercept (3) the contents of (4) an electronic communication (5) using a
device.” 63 If a plaintiff proves all of these elements, a defendant may argue that his or her
interception was lawful under one of the listed exceptions.
An interception is the “the aural or other acquisition of the contents of any wire,
electronic, or oral communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other
device.”64 Congress carved out a spaces for “provider[s] of electronic communications services”
who “may have to monitor a stream of transmissions in order to properly route, terminate, and
otherwise manage the individual messages they contain.” 65 This is known as the “ordinary
course of business exception,” and it balances individual privacy with business development of
the telecommunications industry, which could otherwise be liable for unintended interceptions. 66
The Act also provides that an interception will not be unlawful for a person acting “under color
of law … where such person is a party to the communication or one of the parties to the
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Id. § 2520.
United States v. DiTomasso, 81 F. Supp. 3d 304, 308 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
62 Id. § 2510(12).
63 In re Pharmatrak, Inc. Privacy Litig., 329 F.3d 9, 22 (1st Cir. 2003).
64 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4).
65 Helen Jazzar, Bringing an End to the Wiretap Act as Data Privacy Legislation , 70 C ASE W. R ES. L. R EV. 457, 461
(2019).
66 Id.
61

communication has given prior consent to such interception.”67 These are now commonly
known as the “party” exception and the “consent” exception to liability under the Act.
Companies which fall under these exceptions can intercept communications lawfully.
Although the party exception is the focus of this comment, as it has recently been claimed
by companies hoping to shield themselves from liability under the Act, 68 the consent exception
has also been a central focus of privacy litigation. The legislation requires only one party to
consent to the interception for the provider to be immune from liability.69 Pragmatically, user
consent would be the easiest for companies to obtain, either through formal user agreements or
terms and conditions that a user must explicitly consent to prior to using a company’s services.
Many companies have a separate privacy and cookie policy to address this issue,70 and others
have taken to generating boilerplate cookie policies for companies looking to protect
themselves.71 And while there has been a fair amount of litigation surrounding the content,
reasonableness, and distribution of consent agreements, 72 almost all companies do have
language surrounding monitoring content or cookies in their terms and conditions. Alternatively,
companies have installed “pop-up” windows notifying users that the site they are trying to access
uses cookies, and he or she must accept this practice in order to view the site’s contents.
However, the question of whether the site’s tracking exceeds this agreement is often
nuanced. The trier of fact will have to determine if the intercepted communication exceeds the
plaintiff’s express consent, and if so, to what degree. 73 This is a highly fact-specific inquiry, a
classic example of which occurred in In Re Yahoo Mail Litigation (“Yahoo”), where the
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Id. § 2511(2)(c) (emphasis added).
See generally Google, 806 F.3d 125; Facebook, 956 F.3d 589.
69 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d).
70 See Cookie Policy, M CKINSEY, https://www.mckinsey.com/cookie-policy#; Cookies and similar technology,
ACCENTURE , https://www.accenture.com/us-en/support/company-cookies-similar-technology.
71 See Free Cookies Policy Generator, PRIVACY POLICIES, https://www.privacypolicies.com/cookies-policygenerator/
72 In re Yahoo Mail Litig., 7 F. Supp. 3d 1016, 1028 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
73 Watkins v. L.M. Berry & Co., 704 F.2d 577, 582 (11th Cir. 1983).
68

Northern District of California adopted a “reasonable user” standard in determining whether
Yahoo obtained consent.74 In establishing that accepting Yahoo’s terms of service provided
explicit consent, the court noted that the contract acknowledged its cookie and data monitoring
practice in clear language. By agreeing to the terms of service, the plaintiffs therefore consented
to the conduct. The Yahoo case demonstrates the uphill battle plaintiffs can face when arguing
that they did not consent to the companies’ conduct, a battle that continues to be fought as data
harvesting practices have only increased.
Ultimately, while the authors of the original Wiretap Act, and its amendments, could not
have possibly anticipated these exact usages in the twenty-first century, courts have spent
considerable time analyzing them in light of new and invasive technological developments.
Part III: New Cases
This section will discuss the Google and Facebook cases that have created a circuit split
on the party exception to the Act. In recent years, as cookies have become increasingly
prevalent, companies have found themselves on the receiving end of litigation challenging their
invasive data harvesting strategies.75 Two cases out of the Third and Ninth Circuits have
heightened the inter-circuit divide, largely because they both concern a similar issue surrounding
the unauthorized duplication of “GET” requests.
A GET request is an HTTP, or Hypertext Transfer Protocol, request technique that
retrieves whatever information or data is requested from a particular source, likely a browser, to
the server it is attempting to access on behalf of a user.76 Third-party cookies placed on internet
browsers use these GET requests to determine what web sites a user is visiting, and advertising
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In re Yahoo Mail Litig., 7 F. Supp. 3d 1016, 1028 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
See generally Mount v. PulsePoint, Inc., 684 F. App’x 32 (2d Cir. 2017); Stokes v. Price, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
194032 (D.N.J. Oct. 20, 2020); Zak v. Bose Corp, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96753 (N.D. Ill. May 27, 2020).
76 GET – What is the GET Method, LAST C ALL : THE R APID API B LOG, https://rapidapi.com/blog/api-glossary/get/;
see also HTTP Requests, CODE ACADEMY, https://www.codecademy.com/articles/http-requests.
75

companies can then use the results to create targeted advertisements that companies will pay to
feature on their site.77
Though both courts consider unauthorized duplication of GET requests to be an
interception, the Ninth Circuit (the “Facebook” court) has held that the party exception does not
apply, but the Third Circuit (the “Google” court) considers the third party companies to be
parties within the exception.78 Therefore, the Third Circuit has held that such interceptions are
lawful,79 while the Ninth Circuit has held that they are unlawful, and the companies using such
practices are therefore not shielded from liability under the Act.80
Google was the first circuit case to consider the unauthorized duplication of GET
requests in the context of the Wiretap Act. A report in February 2012 exposed Google and other
defendants’ practice of exploiting loopholes in Safari and Internet Explorer’s cookie blocker
software.81 A covert form placed on websites with Google’s advertisements triggered an
exception to the browsers’ cookie blockers and allowed the defendants to place cookies on the
browser.82 This violated Google’s specific assurances to visitors that Safari’s default settings,
which blocked cookies from third parties and advertisers, would remain intact. 83 Plaintiffs filed
a putative class action asserting claims under the Act and other federal laws, in addition to
various state law claims. 84
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Online Tracking, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (June 2016), https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0042-onlinetracking.
78 See infra Section III.
79 Google, 806 F.3d at 142–43.
80 Facebook, 956 F.3d at 608.
81 Jonathan Mayer, Safari Trackers, Web Policy Blog (Feb. 17, 2012), http://webpolicy.org/2012/02/17/safaritrackers/.
82 Google, 806 F.3d at 131–32.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 133.

The Third Circuit first considered routing information to be “content” under the Wiretap
Act, and adopted the position of the Surveillance Court 85 that queried URLs can contain both
routing and content information.86 The Third Circuit explained that “[a] URL, unlike an IP
address, identifies the particular document within a website that a person views and thus reveals
much more information about the person's [i]nternet activity.”87 The Third Circuit then
considered the defendants’ argument that they were the intended recipients, and therefore a party
under the “party exception.” 88
The court first reviewed the plaintiff’s complaint, which details a process in which
defendants allegedly intercepted the communication between the user’s browser and first -party
website which the user was accessing.89 Crucially, the complaint alleged that:
“[u]pon receiving a []GET[] request from a user seeking to display a particular
webpage, the server for that webpage will subsequently respond to the browser,
instructing the browser to send a []GET[] request to the third -party company
charged with serving the advertisements for that particular webpage.’ As to
Google specifically, the complaint likewise pleads that ‘the server hosting the
publisher's webpage . . . instructs the user's web browser to send a GET request to
Google to display the relevant advertising information for the space on the page
for which Google has agreed to sell display advertisements.”90
Therefore, the issue was twofold: because of the cookie Google inserted in the user’s browser,
the website the user accessed would send a GET request to a third-party advertising company,
and the browser would duplicate the user’s initial GET request and send it to Google for
advertising purposes.91

The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court provides “judicial oversight of Intelligence Community activities in a
classified setting.” Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, ELECTRONIC PRIVACY I NFORMATION CENTER,
https://epic.org/privacy/surveillance/fisa/fisc/.
86 Google, 806 F.3d at 138.
87 Id. (quoting United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510 n.6 (9th Cir. 2008)).
88 Id. at 140.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id.
85

The Third Circuit reasoned that the users’ browsers are directly communicating with
defendants regarding accessing a website, and that therefore the defendants are not obtaining the
GET requests from transmissions “to which they are not a party.” 92 This indicates the underlying
view that, regardless of what Google does with the GET requests or whether the user intended
that his information be used for advertising purposes, if the user employed the browser with the
modified data to access his intended site, then Google was a “party” to the communication.
This seems particularly surprising considering that users did not even consent to this
modified code exploiting a loophole in the browser’s cookie blocker. The Third Circuit stated
that, although it was troubled by the defendants’ covert circumvention of the cookie blocker, it
does not affect whether an entity falls under the “party exception.”93 Looking to cases from the
1960s, it reasoned that a wiretapping statute would likely allow for a party to surreptitiously
participate in a conversation.94 The Third Circuit continued in this vein by noting that the
defendants acquired the information in the “ordinary course,” implying that the court interpreted
this duplication as a natural result of the user using Google to access a separate web site. 95 It
concluded that the plaintiffs’ browsers sent the GET requests directly to the defendant’s servers,
and were therefore the intended recipients of the transmissions. 96 Because of this, they fell under
the party exception of the Act and the interception was lawful.97
The Ninth Circuit, however, took the opposite approach. In Facebook, plaintiffs brought
suit against Facebook’s practice of tracking user’s browsing histories and compiling them into
profiles which would be sold to advertisers.98 Facebook did not dispute that it engaged in this

92

Google, 806 F.3d at 140–41.
Id. at 143.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 141.
96 Id. at 142–43.
97 Google, 806 F.3d at 142–43.
98 Facebook, 956 F.3d at 589, 596.
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practice, even after users logged out of the site. The company did this through embedding third party plug-ins, such as the Facebook “Like” button, on third-party websites.99 These plug-ins
contain pieces of Facebook code that were able to replicate and transmit the user’s GET requests
to Facebook without the user knowing.100 Facebook collected the user’s URL and the third -party
page’s Internet Protocol (“IP”) address. 101 While Facebook executives were aware of the
tracking of logged-out users, they stopped this practice only after a blogger published an
expose.102
Plaintiffs then filed a putative class action, alleging various federal and state causes of
action, including claims under the Act and Stored Communications Act. 103 Like the defendants
in Google, Facebook also claimed that it was acting under the protection of the party
exception.104 The Ninth Circuit specifically noted Facebook’s variation on the normal process of
using a GET request to transmit the referer header, containing the URL with personally
identifiable information, from the browser to the webpage. Crucially, on sites with the Facebook
plug-in, the code “directs the user's browser to copy the referer header from the GET request and
then send a separate but identical GET request and its associated referer header to Facebook's
server.”105
The court continued that the First and Seventh Circuit held that the party exception would
not shield entities from liability for the unauthorized duplication of communications, in the
software and email context, respectively. 106 The court also noted the factual similarity to Google
and its contrary ruling before ultimately adopting the reasoning of the First and Seventh
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Id.
Id.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 596–97.
103 Id. at 597.
104 Facebook, 956 F.3d at 607.
105 Id.(emphasis added).
106 Id.; see Pharmatrak, 329 F.3d at 22, United States v. Szymuszkiewicz, 622 F.3d 701, 706 (7th Cir. 2010).
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Circuits.107 In doing so, the court considered the legislative intent of the Act, which is ultimately
to protect communication privacy and the desire to prevent unauthorized third parties from
accessing the contents of the communication.108 It also recognized that a contrary ruling in line
with Google would “[allow] the exception to swallow the rule” by permitting a wide variety of
intrusions.109 Therefore, Facebook was not shielded from liability under the party exception to
the rule.110 Facebook’s petition for rehearing was denied by the full Ninth Circuit, indicating
that the court did not consider the inter-circuit split to be of “exceptional importance” such that it
needed to be heard en banc.111
A. How did the Courts Diverge?
With largely analogous facts and a similar process of obtaining user’s information,
Google and Facebook experienced different outcomes based on how different circuit courts
interpreted the party exception. While both courts considered their inquiries to be highly factspecific, the Third Circuit based its reasoning almost entirely on the process alleged in the
complaint and the plain meaning of the “party” exception.112 The most obvious example of this
was when the court noted that, because the browser was the entity accessing the GET request
and covertly duplicating it, and the user accessed the third-party site, then the browser is a party
to the communication.113
In coming to this conclusion, the Third Circuit relied on older cases from the Fifth,114
Sixth,115 and Seventh116 Circuits which together hold that “one who impersonates the intended
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Id. at 608.
Id.
109 Id.
110 Facebook, 956 F.3d at 608.
111 Fed. R. Civ. P. 35.
112 Google, 806 F.3d at 140–46.
113 Id. at 140–141.
114 United States v. Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d 852, 863 (5th Cir. 1979).
115 Clemons v. Waller, 82 Fed. App'x 436, 442 (6th Cir. 2003).
116 United States v. Pasha, 332 F.2d 193, 198 (7th Cir. 1964).
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receiver of a communication may still be a party to that communication for the purposes of the
federal wiretap statute and that such conduct is not proscribed by the statute.”117 These cases
were decided prior to the passage of the ECPA and concerned wire and oral communications
where law enforcement aimed to shield its conduct from liability under the party exception.
The Ninth Circuit relied less on a “textualist” reading of what it means to be a party, and
instead considered the overall intent of the Act, which is to prevent duplicitous access to
communications.118 It also seemed concerned with the power the party exception could have
over future electronic transmissions if it interpreted the legislation similar to the Google court,
since this could open the gates for significantly more unauthorized access to these
communications. Finally, the court primarily relied on newer cases concerning electronic
communications,119 as opposed to earlier cases that dealt with wire communications, in coming
to its conclusion. With this reading, it seems clear that the unauthorized duplication of GET
requests and transmission to a third-party advertiser would not shield an entity from liability
under the party exception, regardless of whether the user knowingly used the entity’s services for
a different purpose.
The Ninth Circuit decision is not entirely unprecedented. In 2014, the court held that
Google’s Street View cars, which were collecting personal data like emails, videos, and
documents over unencrypted Wi-Fi networks, could be held liable for an interception under the
Wiretap Act.120 Google attempted to shield itself from liability by arguing that it was exempt
from liability under the “general public” exception, 121 which exempts radio communication
interceptions by any station “for use of the general public.” 122 The court adopted a broad
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reading of the exception, but ultimately concluded that “radio communication” does not
encompass the type of data Google was collecting.123 In doing so, the court considered the
exception in the context of the remainder of the legislation, congressional intent, and the
common sense meaning of the word “radio.”124 While the exception was not the one claimed in
Facebook, the case offers an interesting lens into how the circuit interpreted the Act that
provided a similar framework to what was applied in Facebook.125
While both the Google and Facebook decisions relied on interpreting prior circuit
decisions in light of a changing landscape, such divergent opinions will ultimately create massive
confusion for internet sites and users alike. Therefore, the United States must have a unified
philosophy to address these practices.
Part V: Recommendations
The recommendations of this comment are categorized into three buckets. While the first
focuses on judicial solutions, namely in interpreting the Act, the second and third center on
external and legislative solutions, looking to the European Union’s recently passed data privacy
legislation (GDPR), and on actions that the general public should take in putting public pressure
on search browsers and internet companies.
A. Judicial Interpretation
The most straightforward judicial solution is to interpret the Act to narrow the definition
of “party” to entities that are the intended recipient for the reasonably intended use. A court
could generally ascertain the understanding of all parties from terms and conditions, statements
of consent, and the reasonableness of the user’s respective beliefs as to the privacy of their
communications. In Google, this analysis centered on the court’s careful reading of the
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Plaintiff’s complaint and how the technology worked, ultimately concluding that the “direct
transmissions” between plaintiffs and defendants, regardless of the intentions behind the
transmissions, were enough to establish that defendants were parties to the communications.126
Similarly, in Facebook, this analysis centered on the technical context of the allegations and
congressional intent in holding that Facebook was not a “party” to the communication as it
pertained to the unknown duplication of GET requests.127
This comment strongly advocates for a broad adoption of the position of the Ninth
Circuit, building on First 128 and Seventh129 Circuit decisions, which held that, regardless of the
recipient intended by the party sending out the communication, “simultaneous, unknown
duplication and communication of GET requests do not exempt a defendant f rom liability under
the party exception.”130 Companies would therefore have to obtain approval from the initial user
for both transmitting the GET request to the server and for duplicating this request and
communicating it to other companies and advertising agencies. The Third Circuit’s
interpretation had to rely on older cases that did not take into account the ECPA’s amendments,
and in particular on United States v. Pasha, where the plaintiffs did not bring a cause of action
under the Act and the intercepting party was a law enforcement officer. 131 Crucially, even when
focusing on the scope of the word “intercept,” the Third Circuit did not focus on, or even
consider, the difference between the needs of a law enforcement officer, operating in the scope
of his duties, and a private company looking to harvest user’s data for profit.
Additionally, Pasha did not discuss the Act’s exceptions at all, but rather whether the
communication was “intercepted” to begin with, and therefore has limited applicability to cases
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where often times the fact that a communication was “intercepted” is not disputed. 132 While
Congress likely could not have predicted these practices in 1986, a closer inspection would have
likely led the Third Circuit to an interpretation of the Act more in line with the Ninth Circuit’s,
largely because the Facebook court’s cited cases all dealt with electronic interceptions by private
entities. Interpreting the party exception such that the users must know and intend, not only the
recipient, but what the recipient plans to do with the user’s data, is additionally in line with the
high standard of data privacy in the European Union. 133
Critics of this approach will likely have several counterarguments. First, this would
result in a broad expansion of the protections granted by the Act, since now an entity could only
be considered a party if it was both privy to the communication and the user consented to any of
the entity’s transmissions related to this initial communication. As the Third Circuit decision
notes, this would add an additional qualifier to the definition of “party.” It could also seem
duplicative when read in tandem with the consent exception, which permits an interception
where prior consent had been given.134 Yet the plain language of the consent exception only
concerns the initial interception, not how the entity uses the information extracted from this
interception.135
Therefore, interpreting legislation should be done in light of the rapidly evolving
technological landscape. In this case, the legislative intent of both the Act and ECPA. The Act
was enacted to balance the increased need for information privacy with the demands of law
enforcement, and the ECPA augmented this because there was growing concern regarding the
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issues raised by new digital technologies.136 While legislative history does not provide ironclad
authority when considering differing statutory interpretations, both the Third and Ninth Circuit
relied on it in their holdings. If one takes into account the historical context and intent behind
passage of the legislation, the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of the Act and ECPA is much closer
to the original congressional intent.
Second, the Ninth Circuit’s decision goes against existing precedent. In addition to
differing from Google, Facebook arguably is in tension with the Ninth Circuit’s previous
decision in Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines.137 While the technology at issue in Konop was different
than the GET request duplication in Google and Facebook, the case posed a similar question of
whether unauthorized access to a password protected website constituted an “interception” under
the Wiretap Act.138 While the court did not delve into the party exception, it applied a narrow
definition of interception to electronic communications and held that they must be acquired
during transmission, without taking into account the unauthorized access to the original
communication.139 Although this goes to the “interception” element of proving a prima facie
case under the Act, it still implies that whether an entity’s conduct is unlawful does not turn on
whether the access or transmission of user data was authorized. The Facebook court
distinguished this by noting that Konop concerned “items viewed on a private website,” as
opposed to external plug-ins that covertly duplicated and transmitted GET requests. 140
B. External Solutions
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A second, external solution is to pressure social media and web browsing companies to
begin phasing cookies out of their search engines. There is some hope that companies are
understanding the negative implications of excessive cookie use and are adjusting their browsing
policies accordingly.141 For example, Google recently announced that it will begin a two-year
process of phasing cookies out of its Chrome web browser.142 The company has also proposed
data monitoring technology that would be less invasive than cookies, making it easier to target
advertisements to certain demographics without identifying specific people. 143 Google will now
join Safari and Firefox, which have taken similar stances against data and internet tracking. 144
This could help with more anonymized tracking. While users would therefore receive slightly
less tailored ads, it would be with the knowledge that their specific, identifiable data is not being
sold to third parties. Additionally, users could pressure companies to block third -party cookies
by default, and users would have to opt into these persistent cookies, a model that has already
been adopted by Apple, through its browsing tool Safari, and Firefox. 145
There is greater variance in how companies handle blocking first-party cookies: some
technology companies identify which cookies are used for tracking, and block those by default,
some create mandatory expiration dates for third-party persistent cookies, and some simply do
not block them by default. 146 Users could use similar public pressure to achieve uniformity
between various companies in a way that balances the legitimate functions of first-party cookies
with a greater emphasis on user privacy.
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Google has countered this narrative by surprisingly stating that blocking cookies is bad
for privacy, as it will lead companies to engage in even more invasive practices such as
“fingerprinting.”147 This technique allows a site to build a unique “fingerprint” to identify a
user’s browser based on features such as the browser version, screen size, and fonts installed. 148
However, other privacy advocates, including Jonathan Mayer, who authored the original expose
about Google’s surveillance practices, have strongly opposed Google’s argument, calling it
“privacy gaslighting.”149 They continued that it was a defeatist approach, because it was
attempting to persuade users that “an obvious privacy protection—already adopted by Google’s
competitors—isn’t actually a privacy protection.”150 They additionally stated that there has been
little evidence to suggest the superior value of targeted advertising, noting that when the New
York Times did not experience a decrease in advertising revenue after shifting to contextual and
geographic ads.151
Google has also argued that increased data privacy measures would reduce funding for
advertising agencies and web site publishers, “jeopardiz[ing] the future of the vibrant web.”152
However, while this business practice is profitable, Google’s argument that these profits should
be placed above protecting user privacy implies that the company knows more about what makes
a “vibrant web” than users.
C. Legislative Solutions
In crafting a legislative solution, United States legislators could take inspiration from the
efforts being made in the European Union to combat the impacts on data privacy. The level of
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consent advocated for in this paper is not unprecedented on the global stage, as it is mirrored by
the protections offered in the General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”), including requiring
a user’s explicit consent before an entity can track his or her web site habits. 153 The GDPR,
which passed the European Parliament in 2016, replaced the European Union Data Protection
Directive, which already provided people living in the European Union with the highest level of
data protection in the world.154 The European Union Data Protection Directive, which created
minimum data privacy and security standards, was consistently updated based on a constantly
morphing technological landscape.155 However, the GDPR augments these protections in a few
key ways.
First, it now applies to companies that are not based in the European Union, in addition to
those that are, if they offer goods or services, or monitor the behavior, for people in the EU for
example through offering goods in an EU currency or using an EU national language in the
course of doing business.156 Additionally, the GDPR raised the minimum level of consent a user
must provide to a company for online advertising. 157 It is currently defined as “any freely given,
specific, informed and unambiguous indication of the data subject's wishes by which he or she,
by a statement or by a clear affirmative action, signifies agreement to the processing of personal
data relating to him or her.”158 Crucially, consent must be given by affirmative action such that a
user would have to opt-in to online advertising, as opposed to under previous laws, which many
interpreted as an “opt-out” model of consent.159 Finally, if a company previous obtained a user’s
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consent in a way which was not compliant with the GDPR, the company would have to remove
that user from their marketing emails or re-request consent.
A recent study found that only twenty percent of businesses believed they were GDPR
compliant after the May 25, 2018 compliance deadline had passed, while fifty-three percent were
still implementing these policies and twenty-seven percent had yet to start implementation.160
While these figures clearly demonstrate progress, they also show that the process of improving
data privacy protections for companies is lengthy.
Regardless, the United States should look to adopt similar legislation surrounding data
privacy and protection. Of course, the differing governing systems will likely make this less
likely in the United States on a federal level. California has passed privacy legislation that
provides stricter limits on personal data that can be shared. Under the CCPA, California
residents can ask businesses to turn over any personal information that the business has on them
and how they use that information.161 Residents also have the right to be notified before or after
businesses collect their personal information and can request that businesses stop selling their
personal information (the “opt-out” model).162 While this is not as comprehensive as the
GDPR’s “opt-in” model, it still offers more protection than any federal legislation at this point.
Additionally, California Proposition 24, which passed in the November 2020 election, further
enhances data privacy laws, namely by (1) prohibiting businesses from sharing personal
information and (2) correcting false personal information. 163 However, comprehensive federal
data privacy legislation did not pass on the federal level in 2019 or 2020.164
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There are a few critiques of the GDPR that also surround similar legislation people aim to
enact in the United States. First, it is likely to increase the cost of certain services that consumers
now access for free, because they compensate for these services by providing their browsing
information.165 However, a clear counterargument is that companies can simply provide the
option to consumers, as opposed to removing their agency entirely. A second critique once again
centers on less targeted advertisements, or ads with a “looser fit” than the extremely narrowly
tailored ads users often experience today, and often sharing the data enhances the experience for
the user.166 Once again, this argument minimizes the lack of agency users have in determining
whether their private information is shared or not. As seen in this comment, the harvesting of
their search habits and browsing histories is often done without their consent or understanding.
D. Amending the Wiretap Act
More narrowly, the United States could look to amend the Act to add additional clarity
surrounding the party exception. This is not unprecedented, as the ECPA was an amendment to
the Act extending its protections beyond wire and oral communications to electronic
communications as well, in response to growing concern among legislators that these
communications were not adequately protected.167 Similarly, as the bounds of technology
expand, Congress should look to provide additional protections in light of the original purpose of
the legislation, which was to promote private citizen’s privacy expectations in balance with the
needs of law enforcement.168 Even as early as the early 2000s, circuit courts were
acknowledging that because “the ECPA was written prior to the advent of the Internet and the
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World Wide Web … the existing statutory framework is ill-suited to address modern forms of
communication… .”169 Since its original passage, there have been no substantive changes to the
Act or ECPA in terms of its fundamental pillars or the party or consent exceptions.170
An amendment to the existing Act could be as simple as defining “party” in the Wiretap
Act to fall in line with the holdings from the First, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits, and defining
“consent” in line with the stringent GDPR definition. Any amendment could include language
requiring the initial user have knowledge of what the parties would use the transmission for, or
consenting to distributing any information to third parties.
In a 2010 congressional hearing on amending the ECPA, Richard Salgado, the senior
counsel of law enforcement and information security at Google, noted that “[he has] seen large
gaps grow between the technological assumptions of that earlier era and the reality of how
electronic communication works today.”171 As a result, several technology companies created a
coalition to support “common sense” amendments to the ECPA. 172 While most of these centered
on balancing government access to data with internet privacy, the amendments demonstrate that
technology companies are increasingly aware of the importance users place on privacy
protections.173 Interestingly, just as the ECPA helped create greater public enthusiasm around
the creation of new technologies because people felt more secure with their data, 174 strong
electronic protections around data privacy could actually be a boon for both websites and
advertisers.
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To summarize, this comment advocates for one of three pathways for reform: a unified
judicial interpretation across all circuits in line with the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Facebook,
external solutions like placing pressure on the search engines themselves to install cookie
blockers, and legislative solutions such as enacting a domestic version of the GDPR or amending
the Wiretap Act. While these solutions all have critiques and counterarguments, they are weaker
than the underlying rationale for enacting some iteration of these solutions to ensure a more
unified approach that emphasizes data privacy.
Conclusion
It is clear that with the advent of new technology comes the rise of increasingly
complicated questions. In this case, these questions center on how to interpret older statutes in
light of shifting regulation, rapidly developing electronic infrastructure, and business models that
rely on highly personalized data. Since the ECPA has not kept pace with these advances, many
times it falls to courts to determine how to best interpret older legislation in light of these issues.
The divide that has been created as a result will lead to forum shopping and confusion among
both companies and users alike. The common sense reforms, such as the ones proposed above,
could help reinstate some of the trust that has been lost between these two groups.

